Proliferation Down Under : Turning Australias Atoms for Peace into Weapons for War by Broderick, Mick
Proliferation Down Under: Turning Australia’s 
Atoms for Peace into Weapons for War
Mick Broderick
The history of Australia’s attempts to acquire a nuclear deterrent capacity transpired 
both within and outside the spirit of the international Atoms for Peace program. 
While this article reprises a range of scholarship to provide a historical overview, 
it provides for the first time a level of detail not previously disclosed concerning 
the mechanisms, costs, and approaches of successive Australian governments in 
their estimations of obtaining an indigenous nuclear capacity. One such revelation 
concerns Australia’s “back-door” acquisition option by hosting Peaceful Nuclear 
Explosions, ostensibly for civil engineering purposes, and their provision of pre-
assembled thermonuclear technologies and devices. During the international and 
bilateral negotiations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Australia was deeply 
concerned that the draft Treaty would limit or deny this option.
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Introduction
This article concerns the history of Australia’s planning for, and negotiating to 
acquire, a nuclear deterrent, both within and outside the spirit of the international 
Atoms for Peace program. While the article reprises a range of recent but 
extant scholarship, the historical overview presented here provides, for the first 
time, a level of detail not previously disclosed as to the mechanisms, costs and 
approaches of successive Australian governments in their estimations of obtaining 
this indigenous capacity, especially through Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs).
This is still an arcane history, as Richard Broinowski observes: 
[F]or more than three decades Australian politicians and military, scientific and 
cabinet officials conducted a campaign to persuade the government of the day to 
acquire or develop nuclear weapons. The fact is that Australia has the resources and 
technology to develop its own nuclear weapons (Broinowski 2006, 1).
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Australia’s Post-war Ambitions
Throughout the Second World War, Australia made a modest contribution 
to the Manhattan Project as a member of the British dominion enterprise, 
principally through the delivery of small amounts (via a federal monopoly) of 
Australian uranium and the provision of scientific staff expertise. Chief amongst 
that personnel was physicist Mark Oliphant, who became Australia’s unofficial 
scientific ambassador-at-large in the immediate post-war period. Oliphant was 
implored by the Labor government to return to Australia to help establish the 
Australian National University in Canberra and to create and head the School of 
Nuclear Physics, and he was resourced to build a cyclotron (Cawte 1992, 14).
Post-war industrial development was considered vital by the Labor 
government of the day. To secure a modern, industrial base for manufacturing 
that would diversify the local GDP was crucial. In the mid-1940s Australia’s 
wealth depended almost entirely on the production, consumption, and export 
of wheat and wool. What little industrial base did exist at the outbreak of war 
was quickly co-opted for military and defense purposes. In the early Cold War 
era, Australia’s traditional xenophobic fear of Asian invasion morphed into 
communist contagion. The recent war-time experience of the British Empire 
ignoring domestic security needs (as in Churchill’s infamous “Brisbane” line of 
defense, which expediently sacrificed one-third of Australia to Japanese invasion) 
set the postwar Labor government on a series of nation-building infrastructure 
schemes to modernize the nation. One such venture was the Snowy River 
hydroelectric scheme that cost hundreds of millions of Australian pounds and 
took over a decade to complete (Reynolds 2000, 142).
Another strategic development exercise came with the agreement to host 
a long-range missile test facility in the central Australian desert, in partnership 
with the British (Morton 1989). The August 1945 atomic attacks on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki were widely celebrated in Australia, and viewed as a means of 
swiftly ending the war. Politicians and defense planners quickly sought to 
engage with the idea of atomic defense, long before the Soviet Union acquired 
its own capability four years later, in 1949 (Reynolds 2000, 214). The frightening, 
though inevitable, technological conjunction of Second World War V-weapon 
ballistic missiles with atomic warheads required secure spaces under British or 
Commonwealth control that could perfect rocket, drone, and jet delivery systems 
and experimental explosive ordnance (Morton 1989).
After initially considering a number of remote sites in the United Kingdom 
and Canada, Britain became a Nuclear Power in late 1952, detonating its 
first experimental 20-kiloton device in the Monte Bello islands off Australia’s 
northwest coast. The Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, without 
consulting his Cabinet, then gave approval for a permanent atomic staging 
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ground adjacent to the existing Woomera rocket range. Initial tests were 
conducted at Emu Junction for the 1953 series and then at Maralinga from 1955-
63 (Commonwealth of Australia, 1985).
Despite previous assurances by Whitehall, Australian personnel were, by and 
large, denied access to sensitive nuclear technologies as a result of the 1946 U.S. 
McMahon Act and the wartime Quebec agreement on atomic secrecy. Hence, 
most local participants became scientific observers, service laborers, and military 
adjuncts. Nevertheless, unofficially, the British did attempt to include Australian 
staff in as much technical development as security restrictions would allow. 
These gestures did little to assuage the feeling of betrayal within some circles. The 
expected quid pro quo seemed too little and too late, and had to be argued for 
repeatedly throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
As Jim Walsh’s excellent 1997 exposé of Australia’s “surprise nuclear 
ambitions” reveals, there were two distinct periods in Australian domestic 
nuclear deterrence history: the attempted procurement phase (1956-63) and the 
indigenous capability phase (1964-72). Writing in Nonproliferation Review two 
years before the Gorton Cabinet minutes were declassified under the 30-year rule, 
Walsh reveals that during the first phase, unlike the NATO dual-key arrangement, 
“Australia’s intent was to acquire weapons that would be under purely national 
control” (Walsh 1997, 2). During this “procurement phase” the Government of 
Australia embarked on discussions with the United Kingdom and the United 
States regarding (1) the purchase of tactical weapons, (2) obtaining nuclear 
capable delivery systems, and (3) proposals for access on demand to nuclear 
weapons. All came to naught, however, despite tacit approval from the British to 
consider access under the first and third options, and commitments from both 
the United Kingdom and the United States for the second option via purchases of 
aircraft or missile delivery systems. From the Australian perspective an implicit 
obligation of such military spending would be the link to nuclear capability and 
the potential access to deliverable tactical weapons (Broinowski 2006, 2).
At the very time Britain was exploding a range of atomic devices on 
Australian soil, the local military was negotiating buying British bombs outright 
in the low-kiloton range. Despite a joint Defence Committee recommendation 
being pushed at Menzies to purchase UK weapons—with senior military-to-
military liaison endorsing the proposal—the political leaders in both countries 
stalled. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan met Menzies twice in 1958 
and discussed the proposed purchase, but Macmillan warned that the U.S.-
UK agreement and the revised McMahon Act likely prohibited such transfers. 
However, Macmillan was happy for the joint Air Chiefs to continue working on 
plans, and even on a possible pricing scheme. According to Walsh, “[T]he only 
thing more surprising than Australia’s interest in nuclear weapons was Britain’s 
willingness to provide them. ...[K]ey ministries in London supported the transfer 
of nuclear weapons” (Walsh 1997, 5).
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Yet up to 1960, these negotiations remained blocked by concerns over 
U.S. attitudes to treaty agreements or negotiations (Broinowski 2006). Due to 
domestic austerity measures, Macmillan scrapped the “preferred” nuclear bomber 
and missile system that the Australians had sought, and abandoned other major 
nuclear and missile technology programs being tested in Australia, deciding to 
join America in a limited independent deterrent role, and leaving the Maralinga 
test site for Nevada and the Pacific (Morton 1989). 
In 1961, when the United Kingdom asked Australia to establish listening 
posts for atomic testing, an aggrieved Menzies saw an opportunity for righteous 
indignation. He insisted on a weapons-on-demand arrangement in return for 
signing the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (NTBT)—specifically, “the right to draw on 
the UK nuclear weapons stockpile” if major countries in the Pacific or Indian 
ocean areas “acquired nuclear capability,” or failing that, the “obligation to allow 
Australia the right of access to United Kingdom nuclear weapon ‘know how’.” 
The Cabinet approved Menzies’ position and the Australian Prime Minister 
wrote to Macmillan pressing for the “practical arrangement [necessitating] the 
supply of ready-made weapons” or “full manufacturing data for the production 
of operational weapons” (Walsh 1997, 8). The same letter was to be sent to U.S. 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk. However, when the Soviets returned to testing after 
the three-year moratorium, it looked unlikely that the NTBT would proceed, and 
the Australian Cabinet felt it unwise to push their demand given the resumption 
and rapid flurry of superpower atmospheric testing.
But other pathways remained in play. A top secret July 1965 Australian 
Departmental Minute, entitled “Introduction of Nuclear Power to Australia,” 
refers to the “proposed International Atomic Energy Safeguards scheme (which 
emerged from the Eisenhower ‘Atoms for Peace’ proposal)” in relation to an 
Australian Atomic Energy Commission proposal to install a nuclear reactor 
in South Australia. The IAEA inspection scheme is described as “something 
Australia can scarcely do anything but accept,” but was seen as troubling in its 
impact on the nation’s “future options” for nuclear weapons development. Such 
concerns remained throughout the protracted debate that followed over the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (“Introduction of Nuclear Power to Australia” 1965).
Throughout the 1960s Australia was consistently identified by the CIA in 
National Intelligence Estimates as worthy of remaining on the U.S. “proliferation 
watch” (U.S. National Intelligence Estimate 1966). U.S. Intelligence Board 
documents estimated “a modest program” for producing nuclear weapons “would 
not be prohibitive for most countries with an adequate technological base,” 
projecting costs to be initially between US$500 and 600 million for a program 
of 20 plutonium fission weapons annually (20 kiloton yield each), then dropping 
to US$75-100 million from there onwards. Countries with “natural uranium 
reactors,” whether for research or power generation, were capable of producing 
the required plutonium for weapons. Australia was identified as having “possible 
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incentives to acquire nuclear weapons during the next 10 years,” with the CIA 
estimating it would take “more than 8 years” for Australia to produce and test its 
first device (U.S. National Intelligence Estimate 1966, 2-3).
But how close was this evaluation to reality? A suite of secret Australian 
government studies of domestic nuclear competencies commenced in 1967. 
These were partly prompted by the Chinese detonation of its first atomic weapon 
(October 1964) and its rapid advancement towards thermonuclear prowess 
(June 1967), as well as by more serious attempts by the United Nations to halt 
proliferation with a new treaty (Kaufman 2011). Amongst the multiple top 
secret reports designated “AUSTEO” (Australian Eyes Only), confident but 
contradictory pronouncements were made, although each position has been 
seemingly adopted by successive federal administrations right up to today. The 
observations and recommendations of these documents can be summarized as 
follows:
  1.  Australia has the necessary technical skills and resources to develop its own 
nuclear weapons program, from rudimentary plutonium fission weapons to 
thermonuclear devices.
  2.  It would take approximately 7-10 years and A$117 million to achieve a modest 
arsenal of 30 nominal yield weapons in the 2 to 20-kiloton range at a cost of A$13 
million per annum (Australian Atomic Energy Commission 1968a). These would 
range from “small” demolition devices to Hiroshima-sized atomic bombs.
  3.  A domestic nuclear energy reactor program would be required, with advocates 
noting that much of the technology and industry was indistinguishable and 
complementary across civilian and military nuclear applications. A$80 million 
was estimated as the cost of construction and operation of a 500MW reactor using 
natural uranium. Tenders and construction commenced in the late 1960s at Jervis 
Bay, south of Sydney.
  4.  Given Australia’s geographical location, its isolation and experience with the 
British atomic tests in the 1950s and 1960s, and the 1967 Operation Blowdown 
detonation (U.S.-UK-AUS), Australia was well equipped to test the weapon/s 
domestically, either above ground or underground (Australian Screen Online 
1963). This would cost A$50 million.1
  5.  Defense planning had already purchased advanced weapons delivery systems, 
such as the American F-111 jet fighter, that could readily be modified to carry 
nuclear bombs, with tacit approval from U.S. suppliers. (“Notes on Discussion 
with Director…” 1967). Earlier British nuclear-capable V-bombers were under 
consideration, alongside nuclear-capable surface-to-air missiles such as the U.S. 
Nike and British Bloodhound.
  6.  Consideration of the restrictive safeguards and inspections regime suggested by 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty meant Australia would need to rapidly assess whether 
it would forego the nuclear option in both the medium (10 years) and long term 
(25 years). While the Joint Planning Committee felt that in the next 10 years it 
“was not necessary for Australia to acquire a nuclear weapons capability either 
independently or with the assistance of Allies,” a 10-year period was deemed too 
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short for decisively locking into the NPT, and it recommended that the Australian 
government needed to “keep the question of a requirement under review.”2 This is 
still the position of the Government of Australia into the 21st century.
  7.  Security agreements (ANZUS) and assurances by superpowers of protection and 
cooperation under such a treaty would “not stop all proliferation” or “ensure total 
disarmament” (Australian Atomic Energy Commission 1968b; Tanter 2009, 19).
  8.  One interpretation of the then-draft NPT was that it would prevent 
experimentation for peaceful purposes; e.g. using nuclear explosives for 
engineering and mining (Plowshare), as well as propulsion systems. Australian 
Cabinet Secretary C.L. Hewitt noted for Prime Minister Gorton that any NPT 
must allow Australia to “be free to pursue peaceful nuclear development with 
the result that, if we do so, we will reduce the lead time for nuclear weapons 
production to approximately three years” (Hewitt 1968, 3).
  9.  Australia was/is disproportionately vulnerable to nuclear attack due to its 
centralized/urbanized population residing in a few major cities (90% in 7 capital 
cities), so any regional proliferating atomic aggressor, spurred on by Australian 
nuclear acquisition, could inflict enormous damage with only a few strikes 
(Department of Defence 1968).
10.  Military rationales for a domestic nuclear capability in relation to existing and 
foreseeable regional threats (China and Indonesia) were downplayed: “[T]here is 
no Australian requirement for a nuclear capability against China, while we can 
rely on the United States. Any Indonesian aggression is likely to be of a type (e.g. 
subversion or insurgency) for which nuclear weapons could not be used and for 
which they would not deter” (Department of Defence 1968).
This intense series of studies and contingency plans remains relevant today. 
Indeed, one of the little understood triggers for the dismissal of the Whitlam 
government in 1975 was the Labor agenda to undertake costly uranium 
enrichment after nationalizing Australia’s mines (Reynolds 2008). In the mid-
1980s, Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Hayden recommended that the Hawke 
government pursue an independent deterrent. In the mid-1990s Prime Minister 
John Howard called for a robust review of nuclear policy and pushed for nuclear 
energy and domestic uranium enrichment facilities (Reynolds 2008). Most 
recently—before the Obama Administration’s re-engagement with Southeast Asia 
and the ANZUS alliance, but cognizant of China’s rise and North Korea’s nuclear 
capacity—Australian defense analysts suggested that revisiting the nuclear option 
would be prudent (Heinrichs 2008; Lyon 2009; Tanter 2009). Assurances of a 
guaranteed nuclear response by our allies have often been sought but have been 
definitively deflected. The author will return to these points at the conclusion. 
Beating Plowshares into Swords
Given the limitations of space, this article concentrates on one theme and 
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project that, somewhat surprisingly, has not been previously canvassed by 
other historians and analysts (such as Cawte, Reynolds, Walsh, and Hyams). It 
is an option with a demonstrable link between Eisenhower’s Atoms For Peace 
and Australia’s surreptitious desire to acquire nuclear weapons and related 
technological expertise. 
From the very beginning of the atomic age, the industrial promise of “energy 
too cheap to meter” was matched with a utopian era of medical advancements 
and nuclear engineering feats of biblical dimensions. Deserts would be converted, 
if not into oases, then from barren places into highly productive agricultural 
land. Nuclear explosions could also remove geographical impediments on a scale 
and speed unmatched by conventional explosives. Dams and harbors could be 
blasted into place to capture seasonal runoff in arid areas and to enable mega-
ship bulk carriers access to remote ports. Detonations could fracture ore bodies, 
and stimulate gas and oil production (Marcuse 2000). In terms of domestic need 
and PNE potential, Australia ticked all of these boxes (Kaufman 2011).
As a showcase of the International Atoms for Peace program (beyond the 
generation of electricity) Project Plowshare was embraced by the U.S. Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC). From 1957 a range of nuclear tests, frequently under 
the direction of Edward Teller, was designed to test the idea of the industrial 
application of nuclear explosions. The spin was there at the beginning, too. 
Concerned over the international perception of Soviet technological advances 
with Sputnik, the head of the U.S. Information Agency, Arthur Larson, suggested 
finding a remote coastline in the United States and building a harbor by 
exploding a nuclear device, while inviting the media to observe it (Kaufman 2011, 
24). The Plowshare planners soon found a location. Alaska was deemed suitable 
and designs commenced for a multi-megaton series of blasts, designated Project 
Chariot, to gouge out a harbor using “clean” thermonuclear PNEs (O’Neill 1995). 
But within only a few years, with vocal critics both outside and within the 
AEC objecting on environmental grounds, Chariot was shelved (Findlay 1990). 
The final nail in the coffin came when it was clear that the economic basis for 
the harbor did not hold water. Nevertheless, international conferences spawned 
from the UN’s AFP initiative continued to draw interest on PNE proposals and 
Australian scientists were frequent participants (U.S. Department of Energy 
2000).
Beginning in 1961-62 a series of meetings was held at senior departmental 
level to assess the potential of PNEs for Australia in construction, water storage, 
and mining, and reciprocal scientific visits were arranged. Australian Prime 
Minister Robert Menzies was convinced of their potential by none other than the 
preeminent Australian physicist, Mark Oliphant. In May 1963, the Cabinet sent 
a letter informing AEC chairman Glen Seaborg of Australia’s national interest in 
pursuing Plowshare opportunities. Later that year a core group from the AAEC 
was invited to visit, and it worked alongside the Plowshare team in America 
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(Wilson, Pender, and Carter 1964). Throughout this period Australian state 
governments began to lobby their federal counterparts to assist with their own 
nuclear AFP/PNE projects. They uniformly had the support of the pro-nuclear 
weapons advocate and chair of the AAEC, Sir Philip Baxter (Reynolds 2000, 
145). In the 1950s and 1960s, atomic power stations were seriously considered for 
mining operations in Queensland and South Australia, as was the possibility of 
the Snowy Mountain hydro scheme in the Australian Capital Territory turning 
nuclear. All came to naught. 
Undeterred by these failures, the parochial West Australian premier, David 
Brant, became more determined and championed the use of atomic technologies 
for the remote northwestern part of the state, which was rich in mineral resources 
that were only then beginning to be exploited (Kirsch 2005, 191). The need to 
store water and open ports in isolated areas for shipping vast quantities of iron 
ore to international markets excited the premier and his Minister for Industrial 
Development, Charles Court (Kaufman 2011, 171). Brant sought the approval of 
Menzies at the very time the federal government was negotiating the Limited Test 
Ban Treaty (LTBT). U.S. assurances were sought and provided, with the advice 
that the Johnson Administration was so enthusiastic that the Americans offered 
to provide and emplace the thermonuclear devices—for free—as a demonstration 
of the viability of PNEs and their potential export market (Kaufman 2011, 178).
More importantly for the AEC and U.S. administration, a positive extra-
territorial PNE experience, following the Chariot debacle, could serve as a proof 
of the concept to the Panamanian government in regard to U.S. AEC plans 
for a massive new canal dug by hundreds of nukes. Also, for the domestic U.S. 
audience, a successful West Australian nuclear excavation would bolster plans for 
using PNEs on the trans-American interstate highway scheme.
By the mid-1960s, opposition from the Soviets to Plowshare—chiefly over 
the fallout from explosions crossing international borders, something the LTBT 
prohibited—began to ease, as the Russians commenced tentative cooperation 
with the United States while initiating their own PNE program (Marcuse 2000). 
In this context Australia’s remote location was seen as a major benefit and less 
of an impediment for the international migration of fallout, so the Americans 
anticipated little objection from the USSR.
Secretly Baxter and the AAEC welcomed the opportunity of PNEs to provide 
on-the-ground thermonuclear devices as proxy weapons (Australian Atomic 
Energy Commission 1968b). Australian scientists working with the Plowshare 
project could effectively bypass the nuclear technology-transfer hurdles faced 
by previous Australian governments and international policymakers. In a 
submission to the Cabinet, Baxter alerted the government to a “complete hole” 
in the treaty interpretation, allowing countries to develop nuclear explosions 
seemingly outside of the agreement, which was something the AAEC chair 
demanded (Australian 1969). 
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American diplomatic cables from the era repeatedly advised that the 
Australian government’s sticking points concerning the NPT often involved 
interpretation by the U.S. (and to a lesser degree by Soviet as well as by some non-
nuclear parties) of peaceful explosives and other peaceful technology transfers. 
In one cable, after meeting with an increasingly nationalist Australian Prime 
Minister, John Gorton, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk fulminated:
I ran into a full battery of objections relating to the [NPT]. He [Gorton] sounded 
almost like de Gaulle in saying that Australia could not rely upon the United States 
for nuclear weapons under ANZUS in the event of nuclear blackmail or an attack on 
Australia. ... One of the things which is getting in the way is objections coming out of 
the Australian Atomic Energy Commission and the Defence Departments on all sorts 
of picayune problems. ... I am thinking of inhibitions on the development of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes (Rusk 1968, 1).
Rusk called for a crack team, ideally headed by Seaborg, to visit Australia and iron 
out the technical issues of the treaty, and to head off the “existing bickering within 
the Australian government” on the issue “in order to clear away that underbrush” 
rather than to “take on the major political issue of whether Australia should give 
up the nuclear option” (Rusk 1968, 3).
During the late 1960s, as Australia deferred and prevaricated over signing 
the NPT, the rise of potential PNE projects Down Under flourished. In 1967-68, 
with commercial industry support, a nuclear excavated harbor in West Australia 
at Cape Preston was enthusiastically proposed. When that development failed to 
materialize, and the partners backed away, a second near identical project at Cape 
Keraudren was suggested by different commercial partners in 1969. The latter was 
endorsed by the Western Australia government, Prime Minister John Gorton, and 
by Glen Seaborg, who lobbied newly installed U.S. President Richard Nixon and 
won approval to advance the plans within eight days of Nixon assuming office. 
This vindication of Plowshare by Nixon also came despite the fact that Australia 
had still not signed the NPT, which had previously hindered earlier negotiations. 
Now it seemed no longer an impediment to “progress.” Given these moves Baxter 
quickly established a Plowshare office at the Australian AEC. Next, the Gorton 
government publicly announced it was time for Australia to “enter the atomic 
age.” PNEs and the construction of a natural uranium reactor were firmly on the 
national agenda, as the prime minister sought a mandate from the Australian 
people in the lead-up to the next election for his ambitious and costly national 
nuclear (though undeclared weapons) development program (Australian 1969).
So why didn’t Australia ultimately “go nuclear” via the Atoms for Peace 
pathway? Irrespective of this brief window of opportunity, from 1968-72, to both 
commence a plutonium producing power reactor and acquire thermonuclear 
PNEs on Australian soil, political circumstances overtook the nuclear 
momentum. As a key protagonist in a deeply divided government, Gorton faced 
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an internal no-confidence motion and leadership challenge. The resultant party 
poll was even, and Gorton used his casting vote to resign, incredibly removing 
himself from office. The new Prime Minister, Billy McMahon, was a fiscal 
conservative with no appetite for PNEs and he swiftly set about axing the reactor 
program (Cawte 1992, 131-132). The domestic nuclear deterrent and Plowshare 
option stagnated, then withered and atrophied. 
Oddly, there were other attempts to revive PNEs in Australia, championed 
by the Project Chariot enthusiast and former Lawrence Livermore lab director 
Dr. Edward Teller. Teller visited Australia a number of times, pushing for nuclear 
energy and PNEs to be used in commercial operations by his maverick friend 
and Australia’s then-wealthiest man, mining magnate Lang Hancock (Broderick 
2003). Space doesn’t permit expansion on these near-miss wacky schemes, but 
one from the early 1970s involved detonating a thermonuclear PNE under a large 
seam of asbestos to fracture the iron ore body below. Any materials venting from 
underground would be doubly toxic—from asbestos and radioactivity, both being 
carcinogenic and chronic disease producing.
A Farewell to Arms?
There are still significant insights to be gleaned from the little understood, and 
certainly not widely acknowledged, history of Australian nuclear weapons 
acquisition. Whether stationed locally, a joint-key agreement, a security guarantee 
ensuring an allied nuclear response, PNE access via the legacy of Atoms for 
Peace, or a domestically manufactured bomb, atomic weapons were never far 
removed from Australian military planning. Successive stalled initiatives and 
prime ministerial frustrations at allied ambivalence fuelled the debates around an 
“independent” Australian deterrent. Cabinet Secretary Hewitt’s briefing for Prime 
Minister Gorton on Australia’s potential signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
remains as stark (and as relevant) today as it did in 1968:
As the Americans are so anxious for our support of, and participation in, the Nuclear 
Treaty, it would seem to me that, as a bare minimum, we are entitled to know their 
point of view about their nuclear protection of Australia under the ANZUS Treaty in 
the event of a nuclear threat to Australia. … China will not be a signatory. Will the 
Americans come to our aid, under ANZUS, with nuclear weapons in the event of a 
threat to Australia by Chinese nuclear weaponry? This year; next year; in twenty-four 
years from now? Will they??? (Hewitt 1968)
The declassified NPT negotiation documents demonstrate how close Australia 
came to moving beyond a blueprint towards a program for nuclear competency, 
whether that meant sitting at the threshold with turn-of-the-screw technology, 
or indigenous design, manufacture, testing and deployment—the options were 
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all understood and still remain in place today, despite some analysts suggesting 
otherwise. A dissenting view, for example, comes from Paul Dibb, a former 
senior Australian Defence bureaucrat and Director of the Defence Intelligence 
Organisation. He claims that the 2009 Australian Defence White Paper contains 
“a clumsy allusion to an Australian nuclear weapon option [which] is simply 
unnecessary as it has no prospect of becoming policy under any Australian 
government” (Dibb 2009, 36). However, over the decades multiple writers have 
detailed Australian wariness over allied support, irrespective of security treaties 
and promises by heads of state. Successive Australian governments believed such 
formal instruments would mean little if the strategic chips fell outside of the 
security partner’s national interests. 
As Broinowski maintains, historically, the enduring question has been: will 
the United States “approve or disapprove of Australia developing its own nuclear 
force?”
There had been mixed signals. In 1963, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara had 
told the Minister for External Affairs Garfield Barwick in Washington that it would 
be natural for Australia to develop nuclear weapons if China did. In 1968, Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk told Cabinet in Canberra that the United States supported Australia 
“advancing to a point just short of final manufacture” (Broinowski 2006, 4).
John Gorton was not the only prime minister to question the will and 
commitment of our nuclear allies in coming to Australia’s aid in a regional 
conflict. Before him Menzies reluctantly came to this view, as did Harold Holt, 
then Gough Whitlam and every prime minister since. Ironically, when Prime 
Minister Howard unilaterally invoked the ANZUS treaty immediately after 9/11 
(coincidentally, Howard was about a kilometer from the Pentagon on that day; 
so for him, the event was palpable), he embarked on a reconsideration of nuclear 
technologies and domestic processing. He even embraced the sale of uranium 
to India (with the Bush Administration’s blessing), despite India’s non-signatory 
NTP status—something the recent Gillard government pursued and formalized. 
Now the Obama doctrine has seemingly responded to the challenge of the Asian 
Century, reengaging militarily in the region, including the semi-permanent, 
forward deployment of Marines based in Darwin (Northern Australia).3 China 
and North Korea are regularly identified as potential aggressors, as is an ICBM-
capable Iran. As Raoul Heinrichs warned in his 2008 article “Australia’s Nuclear 
Dilemma: Dependence, Deterrence or Denial?” published in Security Challenges:
As the strategic balance of the region changes, and as nuclear weapons and ballistic 
missile forces threaten to proliferate within Australia’s strategic environment, new 
questions arise about the suitability of Australia’s strategic approach ... to preserve a 
credible nuclear strategy in the uncertain decades ahead (Heinrichs 2008, 55).
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For proliferation analysts and Cold War historians, a key lesson from the 
Australian experience might be that nuclear hedging (potentially by any 
nation) does not prima facie imply a route towards the deterrent option. Yet, a 
determined nation (like Australia) will maneuver to maintain this potential as a 
long-term consideration while nuclear powers steadfastly preserve their deterrent 
defense capabilities. Ironically, under the weapons-grade, fissile material 
production opportunities of international programs, such as Atoms for Peace, 
and the dual-use subterfuge of PNEs, Australia could have acquired a plutonium 
manufacturing reactor or a suite of pret a porter, back-door thermonuclear 
devices (with the added benefit of minimal, “clean” fallout), despite being a 
signatory to multiple prohibitory treaties, up to and including the 1985 South 
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ) and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), ostensibly limiting the use and spread of nuclear weapons (Yusuf 
2009, 55).
What is both ridiculous and preposterous still is that no Australian 
government, while in power, has ever publicly acknowledged these events or the 
desire to keep that option permanently open.
Echoing Raoul Heinrichs, Richard Tanter’s closing paragraphs to his 2009 
Nautilus Institute paper “Rethinking Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Defence 
of Australia,” seem particularly germane:
In contrast to the extended deterrence models in other regions, Australia’s is marked 
by its lack of public presence, a lack of certainty about its standing and character in 
American eyes, its lack of a direct nuclear threat, and its resurgence at a time when 
nuclear abolition possibilities are being embraced by the leader [Obama] of the 
deterrence provider. ...What is necessary is that [these concerns] be addressed in such 
a way that minimally, a pathway to a non-nuclear alliance—or coalition—is visible, 
without at the same time provoking a resurgence of support for either an indigenous 
Australian nuclear weapons capacity, or unjustified greatly expanded defence 
spending. At root, Australians need to ask themselves whether their country needs to 
be, or should be, defended by nuclear weapons (Tanter 2009, 25).
Conclusion
This essay has shown how during the Cold War Australia pursued a range 
of options for acquiring a domestic nuclear deterrent. These options ranged 
from purchasing weapons from allies, to stationing allied nuclear arms, to 
manufacturing them locally or attaining thermonuclear PNE devices ostensibly 
for planetary engineering. It also demonstrates how ongoing Australian defense 
planning and strategic regional thinking remains informed by the potential 
for developing an indigenous nuclear option, however remote. Australia’s 
history of surreptitious desire for the nuclear option, long denied by successive 
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administrations, continues to mask political immaturity and national insecurity 
at the expense of an informed Australian public polity.
Notes
1. Operation Blowdown was an Australian field test in which a 50-ton high explosive 
charge was detonated over a typical rain forest (similar to those in Southeast Asia) at the 
Iron Range Test Site, North Queensland. U.S. participation included the establishment of a 
blast line to obtain overpressure and dynamic pressure measurements, as well as the loan 
of instrumentation and photographic equipment. The experiment also included military 
trial projects that examined the blast effects in forests on items of military material, field 
fortifications, supply points, and foot and vehicle movement. See Kelso, Jack R., and C 
Jr. Clifford. 1964. Operation Blowdown: Preliminary Report. Washington, D.C.: Defense 
Atomic Support Agency. 
2. The proposed NNPT timeline raised concerns for the Australian military especially 
over developing naval propulsion after 1960 and any sea-launched nuclear capability. See 
Yule and Woolner, The Collins Class Submarine Story, Cambridge University Press 2008; 
Reynolds, “The Astute Choice,” Security Challenges, December 2013.
3. On the expanded role of the U.S. military in Australia, see Richard Tanter, “The US 
Military Presence in Australia: Asymmetrical Alliance Cooperation and its Alternatives,” 
The Asia-Pacific Journal 11 (45/1) November 11, 2013.
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